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One of the most well-documented empirical facts in recent U.S. economic history is 
that the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor began to rise during the 1980s, 
and this fact was observed in Mexico as well (Figure 1).1 As can be seen, these two 
countries showed a surprising similar timing of the rise in relative wage.2 
One traditional explanation for this rising wage inequality is based on technological 
change. A sharp decline in equipment prices in the 1980s led to an increase in the 
demand for high-skilled workers, who were complements for this equipment, and a 
decline in the demand for low-skilled workers, who were substitutes (Per Krusell et al., 
2000). This technology-based explanation is consistent with the decline in the price of 
high-tech goods and the increase in the wage inequality both in the U.S. and in Mexico. 
A second explanation for the rising wage inequality is based on trade. The U.S. 
import of low-skill intensive goods from Mexico causes the relative demand for U.S. 
low-skilled workers to decline, and therefore the relative wage of low-skilled to 
high-skilled workers declines. This trade-based explanation has often been criticized 
due to the small volume of trade. Paul R. Krugman (1995, 2000) provides a theoretical 
argument to explain why the small volume of trade in the U.S. makes it unlikely that 
trade can account for the change in wages. 
However, the movements of trade between the U.S. and Mexico are surprisingly 
similar to the movements of relative wage during the 1980s, and in particular, the trade 
between these two countries was dramatically increasing along with the rise in relative 
wage (Figure 2). This similarity in these movements cannot be explained only by 
                                                  
1 We calculated the U.S. relative wage during the period 1970-1990 on the basis of the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). 
Due to data constraint, however, we cite the Mexican relative wage in 1970-1985 and 1988 calculated by Gordon Hanson and Anne 
Harrison (1985) on the basis of the Mexican Industrial Census. Prior to 1988, this Census was conducted at five-year intervals. 
2 Hanson and Harrison (1995) show that it was around 1985 when Mexico announced it was joining the GATT that the wage 
inequality in Mexico began to rise.  
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technological change. Hence, we can no longer ignore the effect of trade on the recent 
increase in skill premium in wages. However, this poses a serious theoretical challenge. 
This is because the previous trade-based explanations, the standard H-O 
(Heckscher-Ohlin) model and its applications (Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. 
Hanson, 2001), demonstrate a discrepancy between the model and data.3 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem of the H-O model predicts that the relative wage of 
high-skilled to low-skilled labor will increase in the high-skill abundant U.S. but 
decrease in low-skill abundant Mexico after trade. These models thus generate a 
positive relation between the trade and wage inequality in the U.S. but generate a 
negative relation in Mexico. On the other hand, as we have seen, the data shows that the 
trade and skill premium were rising in both countries during the 1980s, and thus 
generated a positive relation between the trade and wage inequality in both countries. 
This is a “wage inequality anomaly.”4 
Thus a new model of trade which can eliminate this anomaly should be considered. 
This new model will be a possible explanation for the rising wage inequality across 
countries as an alternative to the technology-based explanation. 
In order to eliminate the wage inequality anomaly, a new model of trade needs to 
endogenize the technological term since the Stopler-Samuelson channel works as long 
as it is exogenous. Some economists are trying to explain the wage inequality on the 
basis of trade with endogenous technology. The major explanations are based on the 
                                                  
3 Feenstra and Hanson (2001) interpret the standard H-O model as the model of trade in two intermediate goods which are 
high-skill and low-skill intensive. It is shown that the decline in low-skill intensive imported input causes the fall in the relative 
wage of low skill. They define the import of low-skill intensive input as the “outsourcing.” Their model displays that the price of 
domestic final good relative to the price of imported input rises, which is consistent with U.S. data during the 1980s. 
4 The focus of this paper is on the discrepancy between the standard H-O model and the data during the 1980s. We should also 
consider whether this discrepancy remained or not after the 1980s. Unfortunately, the movements of the Mexican skill premium 
during the 1990s are unclear as will be discussed in Section III. This problem is outside of the scope of this paper; however, further 
investigation is needed.    
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Schumpeterian mechanism. Elias Dinopoulos and Paul Segerstrom (1999) show that 
trade encourages R & D investment, resulting in innovation and skill-biased 
technological change in each country. They also show that this idea, linking innovation 
to skill premium, is supported by empirical evidence.5 Daron Acemoglu (2002) shows 
that trade “induces” skill-biased technological change in the U.S. and this improved 
technology can be transferred to other countries by spillover effects. Thus these 
explanations demonstrate the rise in the relative wage of high-skilled labor across the 
countries.6  
The main purpose of this paper is to present a much simpler resolution of the wage 
inequality anomaly on the basis of a trade model consistent with data. Our resolution is 
based on a straightforward application of well-known variety trade models. The 
standard variety trade models with monopolistic competition (Krugman, 1979; Avinash 
Dixit and Victor Norman, 1980; Wilfred J. Ethier, 1982) say that the variety of goods, 
which consumers can consume or producers can use, increases in both countries after 
trade, and therefore their utility or production increases. Let us emphasize again that 
they say something increases in both countries after trade. 
Upon application of their logic, we show that the intra-industry trade in 
differentiated intermediate goods increases the variety of intermediate goods used by 
the high-skill intensive final good in both countries. This directly causes the marginal 
product of high skill, the demand for high skill by the final good, to shift upward in both 
                                                  
5 Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) show that a contemporaneous correlation between an index of the relative price of innovation 
and an index of the U.S. skill premium was 0.80 during the period 1963-1989.  
6 Acemoglu (2002) might not be successful in explaining the fact that the U.S. and Mexico showed the surprisingly similar timing 
of the rise in skill premium around 1985. This is because the rise in skill premium in Mexico should be driven by the spillover 
effects in his model but this spillover process usually takes many years. 
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countries. Consequently, the real wage of high skill rises in both countries. Moreover, if 
the varieties and high skill are “complements,” the relative wage of high skill, the skill 
premium, rises in both countries. The intra-industry trade can stimulate the variety-skill 
complementarity. Thus the wage inequality anomaly is eliminated in our model of trade. 
This linking of the intra-industry trade to the wage inequality is supported by 
available empirical evidence. The intra-industry trade between the U.S. and Mexico was 
extensive, and the intra-industry trade index between the U.S. and Mexico and the 
relative wage of high-skilled labor showed surprisingly similar movements in both U.S. 
and Mexico manufacturing industries during the 1980s. The variety-skill 
complementarity is an innocuous assumption as shown by the U.S. history of production 
organization, and the movements of the relative price of high-skill intensive final good 
and the relative wage of high skill are also consistent with the observations in the U.S. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we formulate a very 
simple model of trade in differentiated intermediate goods, and we show that our model 
can eliminate the wage inequality anomaly. Section II shows that our model is 
supported by available empirical evidence. Finally, we summarize main results and 
mention future research in Section III. 
I. Model 
In this section, we first formulate our model. Second, we explicitly solve the model 
and show that trade can increase the skill premium in both countries, thus eliminating 
the wage inequality anomaly. Finally, we mention some economic reasons for the 
derived results. 
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A. Ingredients of the Model 
Consider an economy with a final good sector and an intermediate goods sector. 
There are two types of skills: high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Their endowments are 
given by H  and L , respectively. These skills differ in that the high-skilled labor can 
do both high-skill and low-skill tasks while the low-skilled labor can do only a low-skill 
task. As will be shown later, this excludes the possibility that the relative wage of 
high-skilled to low-skilled labor is less than one in equilibrium.  
The production side is as follows. The final good sector is perfectly competitive and 
non-traded. It uses the differentiated intermediate goods and high skill. Handling a 
variety of intermediate goods is a high-skill task, thus requiring the high skill. The 
technology is given by the following constant returns to scale production function: 
( )
ε
ε
ρε
ρ
/1/
0 ⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫ Hdjjxy n  
where y  is the output of final good, ( )jx  and H  are the demand for differentiated 
intermediate good j  and high skill, and the total number of variety is n . We assume 
that 1<ε  and 10 << ρ . The elasticity of substitution between the varieties and high 
skill is given by ( )εσ −= 1/1 . As can be seen, the production function combines the 
Dixit-Stiglitz and CES production functions.  
On the other hand, the differentiated intermediate goods sector is monopolistically 
competitive. Firms are symmetric and follow Cournot pricing rules. There is also free 
entry and exit. The intermediate goods can be traded.7 Each variety requires a low-skill 
task, and the technology of each variety is given by the following increasing returns to 
                                                  
7 Trade in these differentiated goods is interpreted as intra-industry trade (Dixit and Norman, 1980; Ethier, 1982). Thus in the 
following discussion, the word “trade” refers to intra-industry trade. 
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scale production function: 
( ) ( )[ ]0 ,max1 fjl
b
jx −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= , j∀  
where ( )jl  is the demand for low skill to produce each variety j , f  is the fixed cost 
in terms of low skill, and b  is the unit low-skill requirement. Note that part of high 
skill can also do the low-skill task.   
The demand side is as follows. For simplicity, we focus on a representative 
consumer who has the endowments of high skill and low skill: H  and L . He or she 
consumes the final good. His or her utility function is given by: 
ccu =)(  
where c  is the quantity of the final good he or she consumes. His or her budget 
constraint is given by: 
SLSH
y LwHwcp +=  
where yp  is the price of the final good, 
Hw  is the wage for the high skill, Lw  is the 
wage for the low skill. SH  is the supply of high skill for the final sector, and SL  is 
the supply of low skill for the intermediate sector, which can include part of high skill. 
We assume that HH S ≤≤0  and HLLL S +≤≤ . 
   The feasible conditions for the high-skilled and low-skilled labor are: 
SHH =  and ( )∫ =
n
SLdjjl
0
. 
B. Explicit Solutions and the Autarky Equilibrium 
We explicitly solve our model. First, we derive the solutions in the intermediate 
goods sector.8 
                                                  
8 More detailed solutions in the intermediate goods sector are shown in Appendix A. 
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In the short run, given an arbitrary n , each producer of varieties facing the indirect 
demand by the final good sector maximizes the profit ( ) ( ) ( ) fwjbxwjxjp LL −−  
where ( )jp  is the price of intermediate good j . By setting 1=Lw  as numeraire and 
using the symmetry ( ) xjx = , the short run output x  and price p  of each variety 
can be given by: 
( )
( )
Hn
np
bx
y
ε
ρε
εε
ρε ρ
/1
/
1/
1/
−−
− ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= , j∀ , and 
ρ
bp = , j∀ . 
Since the price does not depend on the number of varieties n , the price in the long 
run, when the profit of each variety becomes zero by the free entry and exit, is also 
given by ρ/bp = , and the zero profit condition 0=−− fxbxp  with ρ/bp =  
gives the long run output x  of each variety. The equality of labor demand and supply 
in intermediate goods sector, ( ) SLfxbn =+ , gives the long run number of varieties n . 
Thus in the long run, the price p  and output x  of each variety and the number of 
varieties n  are given by: 
ρ
bp = , j∀ , 
( )ρ
ρ
−= 1b
fx  , j∀  and 
( )
f
Ln
S ρ−= 1 . 
We next derive the solutions in the final good sector.9 
In our model with the CES production function, it is not difficult to obtain an 
explicit solution for the demand for each variety by the final good sector, but we solve 
the maximization problem for the final good sector by means of the following short-cut 
                                                  
9 More detailed solutions in the final good sector are shown in Appendix B. 
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method. Define a new good ( )
ρ
ρ
/1
0
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫
n
djjxX and its price Xp , and we can show 
desired results more easily.  
The profit of the final good sector now becomes: 
( ) HwXpHXp HXy −−+ εεε /1 . 
Since the new good X  shows the constant returns to scale with varieties ( )jx , we 
have the following equality: 
( ) ( )∫=
n
X djjxjpXp
0
. 
First, by solving the cost minimization problem for the good X , we find that the 
price of X  is: 
( ) ( )
( ) ρρ
ρρ
/1
0
1/
−
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫ djjpp
n
X . 
By symmetry ( ) pjp = , this Xp  becomes: 
(1)                           ( ) pnpX ρρ /1−= . 
Second, we solve for X . Since the technology of the final good shows the constant 
returns to scale with X  and H , we have the following equality: 
y
H
X
p
HwXpy += . 
On the other hand, the demand for the final good is given by: 
y
SSH
p
LHwc += . 
The final good market clearing cy =  and the feasible condition for the high skill 
SHH =  then give: 
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S
X LXp = . 
Thus X  is given by: 
(2)                             
X
S
p
LX =  
where ( ) pnpX ρρ /1−= . 
Third, we solve for Hw . The first order conditions with respect to X  and H  for 
the final sector give: 
H
X
w
p
H
X =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −1ε . 
By solving for Hw  with (2) and SHH = , in autarky equilibrium Hw  is given 
by: 
(3)                         
ε
ε
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
S
S
X
H
H
Lpw     
where ( ) pnpX ρρ /1−= . Since we have normalized 1=Lw , the relative wage of 
high-skilled to low-skilled labor is simply given by Hw . 
This autarky equilibrium is represented in Figures 3-a and 3-b. The demand for high 
skill and low skill by the production side, H and L , is represented by the iso-quant 
curve of the final good: ( )[ ] εεε /1  HpLy X +=  which is given by ( ) εεε /1HXy +=  
and (2). On the other hand, the supply of labor for each sector, SH  and SL , is 
represented by AB. The autarky equilibrium is then achieved at A in Figure 3-a or C in 
Figure 3-b, and thus the relative wage of high skill Hw , given by the slope of the 
iso-quant curve, is greater than or equal to one before trade. 
Since the focus of this paper is on the skill premium, in the following main text we 
concentrate on the interesting case as shown in Figure 3-a, in which the relative wage of 
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high skill given by (3) is greater than one. Thus the high skill and low skill each do 
their own task, letting HH S =  and LLS = . In Appendix E, we briefly analyze the 
case as shown Figure 3-b, in which the relative wage of high skill given by (3) is one 
and the high skill is doing both high-skill and low-skill tasks. 
C. Trade Equilibrium and the Elimination of Wage Inequality Anomaly 
Consider two countries: country 1 and country 2. They have identical technologies 
and preferences. They can be different in their endowments of high-skilled and 
low-skilled labor. We assume that the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor 
is greater than one in both countries before trade as shown in Figure 3-a.  
From the derived solutions in the intermediate goods, we easily get the following 
information. Here, let us focus only on the one country.  
The output x  and price p  of each variety are not changed before and after the 
intra-industry trade in intermediate goods, and the supply of labor for the intermediate 
goods sector, which is given by LLS =  before trade, cannot fall below this L  after 
trade. This implies that the number of varieties produced within each country, which is 
given by ( ) fLn ρ−= 1  before trade, does not decrease after trade. Thus the total 
number of varieties, which is available to the final sector after trade, surely increases 
since it is given by the sum of the number of varieties produced within each country 
after trade.  
Given this information, we show the following results. 
First, from (1) we see that Xp  decreases after trade since the increase in n  
decreases ( ) ρρ /1−n  with 1<ρ  and jp  is constant at p . 
Second, from (2) we see that X  increases after trade since Xp  decreases and 
SL , 
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which is L  before trade, does not decrease. This implies that the marginal product of 
high-skilled labor given by ( )( ) 11/1 −−+= εεεε HHXMPH  increases for any H . That is, 
the demand for high skill by the final good shifts upward. Since the supply of high skill 
for the final good, which is H  before trade, does not increase, this implies that the real 
wage of high skill y
H pw /  increases.  
Finally, from (3) we see that if 0<ε  ( 1<σ ), that is, if the varieties and high skill 
are “complements,” the relative wage of high skill Hw , the skill premium, increases 
after trade.10 This is because εXp  increases and ( ) ε−1SS HL , which is ( ) ε−1HL  
before trade, does not decrease.  
Thus it follows that the high skill and low skill each do their own task after trade as 
well. That is, the supply of labor for the final and intermediate sectors remains at 
HH S =  and LLS = , respectively. Hence, the number of varieties produced within 
each country after trade remains at the autarky level ( ) fLn ρ−= 1 . 
Note that the above results are also obtained in the other country. Hence, we get the 
following results. 
The intra-industry trade in intermediate goods causes the total number of varieties 
available to the final good sector to simply increase from in  to 21 nn + , the sum of the 
autarky levels, in each country 2  and  1=i . This causes the price iXp  to decline, and 
this decline in iXp  causes the output iX  to increase in both countries. Consequently, 
the demand for high skill shifts upward, thus increasing the real wage of high skill in 
both countries (Figure 4). Moreover, if the varieties and high skill are complements, the 
decrease in the price iXp  also increases the relative wage of high skill 
H
iw , the skill 
                                                  
10 In this paper we define the case 0<ε  ( 1<σ ) as the case where the varieties and the high skill are “complements.” 
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premium, in both countries. Thus the wage inequality anomaly has been eliminated in 
our model of trade. 
Let us derive more implications from the above argument. First, since the number of 
varieties before trade is given by fLn ii /)1( ρ−=  in each country 2  and  1=i , the 
ratio of the number of varieties produced within each country before trade is given by 
2121 LLnn = . This implies that the rate of increase in in  is smaller in an absolutely 
low-skill abundant country and therefore the rate of decrease in iXp  is also smaller by 
(1). Hence, the rise in the relative wage of high skill Hiw  is smaller in an absolutely 
low-skill abundant country by (3). 
Second, if 0=ε  ( 1=σ ), that is, if the production function of the final good is 
given by the Cobb-Douglas function, from (3) we see that the relative wage of high skill 
Hw  is not affected by the decrease in Xp  and therefore does not change after trade. 
D. Economic Reasons for the Results 
Before going to Section II, we need to consider economic reasons for some of the 
results which have been shown in I-C on the basis of the explicit solutions to the model. 
First, we explain the economic reason why the good X  increases after trade, that is, 
why the MPH  increases after trade. 
As we have seen, the activities in the intermediate goods sector never change at all 
in each country after trade. Some changes, however, do occur after trade. The number of 
varieties used by the final good sector increases, while the quantity of each variety used 
by the final good sector decreases in each country since each variety is shared by two 
countries. 
Let us compare the marginal products of high-skilled labor before and after trade. 
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For each country 2  and  1=i , they are given by: 
( )[ ]( ) 11/1 /1 −−+= εεεερ iiDiii HHxnMPH  and 
( )( )[ ]( ) 11/1 */121*  −−++= εεεερ iiDii HHxnnMPH  
where iMPH  is the marginal product of high skill, in  is the number of varieties, and 
D
ix  is the demand for each variety by the final sector in each country 2  and  1=i . Let 
the asterisk * denote the variables after trade. 
   According to Appendix C, the input of each variety decreases from xx Di =  to 
( )[ ] xnnnx iDi    / 21* += , so it decreases to ( )[ ] 100 / 21 ×+ nnni  percent of x . On the 
other hand, as has been shown in I-C, the total number of varieties available to the final 
good increases simply from in  to 21 nn + , so it expands to ( )[ ] 100 / 21 ×+ innn  
percent of in . 
Can the effect of increase in the number of varieties be canceled by the effect of 
decrease in the demand for each variety? The answer is No. This is because 1/1 >ρ . 
Hence, the effect of increase in the number of varieties is greater than the effect of 
decrease in the quantity of input. Thus the marginal products of high skill, that is, the 
demand for high skill, increases in both countries. 
Recall that the result presented here relied on the crucial effect in the variety trade 
models which Ethier (1982) called the “international returns to scale.” That is, xn ρ/1  
displays that the increased number of inputs, n , translates into higher productivity 
since 1/1 >ρ . 
Next, we explain the economic reason why the relative wage of high skill can rise 
after trade. Note that the relative wage of high skill in the country 2  and  1=i  is 
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simply given by Hiw . 
Now the final good market clearings cy =  in each country 2  and  1=i  before 
trade are given by: 
iy
ii
H
i
i p
LHw
y
+= . 
Since iyi
H
i MPHpw =/ , this becomes the following: 
i
yi
iii Lp
HMPHy 1+⋅= . 
As we have seen, the marginal product of high skill increases in country 
2  and  1=i  after trade. For the same reason, the output of final good also increases in 
each country 2  and  1=i  after trade.  
Since ( )[ ]( ) 11/1 /1 −−+= εεεερ iiii HHxnMPH  and ( )[ ] εεερ /1 /1 iii Hxny += , it can be 
shown that the rate of increase in iMPH  is greater than the rate of increase in iy  if 
0<ε , that is, if the varieties and high skill are complements. This relation and the final 
good market clearing condition iyiiii LpHMPHy ⋅+⋅= /1  imply that the rate of 
increase in iMPH  should be greater than the rate of change in yip/1 . In other words, 
the rate of increase in the real wage of high skill yi
H
i pw /  is greater than the rate of 
change in the real wage of low skill. Thus the relative wage of high skill can increase in 
each country 2  and  1=i . 
II. Evidence 
   In this section, we show that the idea presented in this paper is supported by 
available empirical evidence and the movements of the relative price of high-skill 
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intensive final good and the relative wage of high-skilled labor are consistent with the 
observations. 
A. Intra-industry Trade and the Relative Wage of High-Skilled Labor 
Recall the idea presented in this paper. We have linked the intra-industry trade in 
differentiated varieties to the wage inequality through the variety-skill complementarity. 
Hence, the main implications of the model are that the intra-industry trade should be 
extensive and should be positively correlated with the relative wage of high-skilled to 
low-skilled labor, and that the varieties and high-skilled labor should be complements. 
Table 1 lists the U.S. exports to and U.S. imports from Mexico in 1985 and 1990. 
The data is obtained from the International Trade Administration. As can be seen, in 
1985 three SITC product categories (6, 7, and 8) appear in the top five on both lists, and 
machinery and transport equipment is 49 percent of U.S. export to and 29 percent of 
U.S. import from Mexico. As can also be seen, in 1990 four SITC product categories (0, 
6, 7, and 8) appear in the top five on both lists, and machinery and transport equipment 
is 48 percent of U.S. export to and 45 percent of U.S. import from Mexico. This 
indicates that intra-industry trade between the U.S. and Mexico was extensive around 
1985 when these two countries showed a surprisingly similar timing in the rise in skill 
premium. This extensiveness of intra-industry trade got stronger in 1990. 
Next, Figures 5-a and 5-b plot the intra-industry trade (IIT) index between the U.S. 
and Mexico and the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor in both U.S. and 
Mexico manufacturing industries during the 1980s, respectively. This IIT index is a 
weighted average over SITC 3-digit manufacturing industries. IIT index for industry i  
is defined by the following Grubel-Lloyd index: 
 16
( ) iMX
MX
IIT
ii
ii
i industry for   1 +
−−=  
where iX  and iM  represent export and import of industry i . In order to find this 
index for a country, we compute a weighted average of the siIIT  as follows
11: 
( )∑
∑
+
−
−=
i
ii
i
ii
MX
MX
IIT 1 . 
The data is obtained from the OECD International Trade by Commodities Statistics 
(ITCS).  
On the other hand, the average annual wage of non-production relative to production 
workers is used as an index for this relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor in 
U.S. and Mexico manufacturing industries. The source of data for the U.S. relative wage 
is the same as for Figure 1. The Mexican relative wage, on the other hand, is calculated 
by Hanson-Harrison (1995) on the basis of the Mexican Secretariat of Trade and 
Industrial Promotion (SECOFI).12 This SECOFI survey began in 1984, so we do not 
have data during the period 1980-1983. It is, however, fortunate for our purpose that the 
skill premium in Mexico began to rise after the sample period started. 
As can be seen, the IIT index and the relative wage of high-skilled labor showed 
surprisingly similar movements both in the U.S. and in Mexico during the 1980s. In fact, 
the correlation between the IIT index and the relative wage of high skill was high: it was 
0.80 in U.S. manufacturing industries during the 1980s, and in particular, it was 0.91 
                                                  
11 It is possible to relate our model to the work by Herbert G. Grubel and Peter J. Lloyd (1975). We can express their IIT index in 
terms of the solutions in our model. In fact, the IIT index in our model is simply one as is shown in Appendix D. 
12 The Mexican Industrial Census and the SECOFI show almost identical movements (Hanson-Harrison, 1995). In fact, between 
1985 and 1988, the relative wage given by the SECOFI rose from 1.917 to 2.116 as shown in Figure 5-b, which matches the 
movements the Industrial Census shows in Figure 1. Figure 5-b is based on the SECOFI, but we approximated the relative wage in 
1980 from the relative wage in 1980 given by the Industrial Census. This approximated relative wage was adjusted so that the 
relative wage in 1988 is common to both data sources.   
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and 0.84 in U.S. and Mexico manufacturing industries after 1984, respectively. 
Thus the linking of the intra-industry trade to the relative wage of high skill is 
supported by this evidence both in the U.S and in Mexico. 
B. Variety-Skill Complementarity 
It is plausible to assume that the increased variety of tasks translates into higher 
demand for high-skilled labor. In fact, the U.S. history of production organization 
supports this assumption of variety-skill complementarity.  
During the first half of the 20th century, the spread of mass production, which is 
characterized by Ford’s factories, led to the larger size of manufacturing plants. On the 
other hand, during the second half of the century, flexible machine tools have allowed 
plants to operate at a smaller scale. The organization of production has changed from 
mass production with a traditional assembly line to smaller customized batches, thus 
making the size of plants smaller.13  
Workers on the assembly line have a single routine task to perform; however, 
workers in each batch are no longer as highly specialized in a single routine task. Each 
batch is highly customizable and requires a worker who can handle a wide variety of 
tasks depending on the custom features of the batch. Thus the change in the production 
organization affected the number of tasks and therefore affected the importance of skills. 
As the tasks shifted from a single routine task to a wide variety of tasks, the required 
skill shifted from low skill to high skill. Thus the varieties and high skill have been 
complements in the history of U.S. production.14  
                                                  
13 Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990) show empirical facts on a change in the size of U.S. manufacturing plants. 
14 Matthew F. Mitchell (2001) relates a plant size to skills, and he shows how much the change in the plant size can account for the 
movement in the skill premium over the century.  
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C. Relative Price of High-Skill Intensive Good 
The standard H-O model predicts the same direction of movement of the relative 
price of high-skill intensive good and the relative wage of high-skilled labor since the 
rise in the relative wage of high skill should be driven by the rise in the relative price of 
high-skill intensive good in the high-skill abundant U.S. However, data shows that the 
relative price of high-skill intensive good was declining or constant during the 1980s 
while the relative wage of high skill was increasing in the U.S. (Robert Lawrence and 
Matthew J. Slaughter, 1993). 
Our model demonstrates price movement consistent with this observed fact whereas 
the H-O model cannot. In I-D, it has been shown that the rate of change in yip/1  
should be smaller than the rate of increase in iMPH  if 0<ε . This implies that yip/1  
can rise (but it should rise less than iMPH ) and therefore the price of final good yip  
can decline. Here, recall that the price of the low-skill intensive variety is constant 
before and after trade. Hence, the relative price of high-skill intensive final good yip  
can decline while the relative wage of high skill rises, letting 0<ε . Thus the rise in the 
relative wage of high skill can happen without the rise in the relative price of high-skill 
intensive final good.15 
III. Conclusion and Future Research 
The main purpose of this paper has been to eliminate the wage inequality anomaly 
with a much simpler trade model consistent with empirical evidence. 
Section I has presented a simple trade-based resolution of the anomaly. We have 
                                                  
15 Note that the price of final good can be constant or increase if 0<<ε . 
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shown that the intra-industry trade in differentiated intermediate goods increases the 
variety of intermediate goods used by the high-skill intensive final good in both 
countries; as a result, if the varieties and high skill are complements, then the skill 
premium rises in both countries after trade. Thus intra-industry trade can stimulate 
variety-skill complementarity. 
Section II has shown that our model is consistent with empirical evidence. The 
linking of the intra-industry trade to the wage inequality is supported by available 
empirical evidence. The intra-industry trade between the U.S. and Mexico was extensive, 
and the IIT index between the U.S. and Mexico and the relative wage of high-skilled 
labor showed surprisingly similar movements in both U.S. and Mexico manufacturing 
industries during the 1980s. The assumption of variety-skill complementarity is also 
supported by the U.S. history of production organization, and the rise in the relative 
wage of high skill can happen without the rise in the relative price of high-skill 
intensive final good, which is also consistent with the observed fact in the U.S. 
It is true that the standard H-O model and its applications are impossible 
explanations for the rising wage inequality across countries. However, we can no longer 
say that trade explanations in general are impossible because the model of trade 
presented in this paper provides a possible trade-based explanation for the rising wage 
inequality across countries as an alternative to the technology-based explanation. The 
result that trade can theoretically raise the wage inequality is not necessarily negative 
since our model shows that the real wage of both high skill and low skill can rise despite 
the increase in inequality. 
Of course, there is still room for future research. First, we shall extend our model to 
a dynamic model and calibrate it to explain time series data. This data shows the rising 
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wage inequality over time both in the U.S. and in Mexico. This causes us to consider 
more the substitutive relation between high skill and low skill. Second, we can analyze 
the relation between the competition policies and wage inequality. In our model, the 
change in the number of varieties is related to wage inequality. This implies that 
government can affect wage inequality by entry policies which adjust the number of 
firms. Third, our model has been applied to the problems of trade between the U.S. and 
Mexico, but we can also directly apply it to the problems of intra-trade among EU 
nations. 
Finally, the focus of this paper has been on the elimination of the discrepancy 
between the standard H-O model and the data during the 1980s. We should next 
consider whether this discrepancy remained or not after the 1980s. Unfortunately, the 
movements of the Mexican skill premium during the 1990s are unclear. Raymond 
Robertson (2004) argues that the skill premium in Mexico significantly declined from 
1994 to 1998 on the basis of the Mexican Industrial Census. Unlike the observations 
during the 1980s, this finding seems consistent with the predictions of the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, it can also be shown on the basis of the Mexican 
Monthly Industrial Survey (EIM) that the Mexican skill premium actually increased 
over the same period. The Mexican Industrial Census and the EIM thus show 
movements in the opposite direction over the period 1994-1998, whereas both show a 
rising trend during the late 1980s. It would seem, therefore, that further investigation is 
needed in order to analyze the movements of the Mexican skill premium during the 
1990s. 
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Appendix 
A. Intermediate Goods 
Short run: Given arbitrary n , derive the indirect demand, MCMR = , and find ( )jp  
and ( )jx . 
Step 1: Derive the indirect demand of intermediate good j . 
From the problem of the final good, we get: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) 1
1/
0
1/1/
0
1 −
−−
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⎞
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ρ
ε
ε
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ρ ρρ
ε
ε jxdjjxHdjjxpjp
nn
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Step 2: MCMR = . 
The differentiated intermediate goods sector is monopolistically competitive with 
Cournot pricing rules. 
Solve the following problem:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) fwjbxwjxjp LLjx −− max . 
The first order condition w.r.t. ( )jx  is given by: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) bwjxdjjxHdjjxp Lnny =⎟⎟⎠
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Step 3: Find ( )jx  and ( )jp . 
By setting 1=Lw  as numeraire and using the symmetry ( ) xjx = , we get: 
( )
( )
Hn
np
bx
y
ε
ρε
εε
ρε ρ
/1
/
1/
1/
−−
− ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= , j∀ , and 
ρ
bp = , j∀ . 
Long run: Zero profit condition 0=−− fxbxp  with ρ/bp =  gives the following 
long-run output x  of each variety: 
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( )ρ
ρ
−= 1b
fx  , j∀ . 
With )1(/ ρρ −= bfx , the labor market clearing in the intermediate goods sector, 
( ) SLfxbn =+ , gives the long run number of varieties, n : 
( )
f
Ln
S ρ−= 1 . 
B. Final Good 
Define a new good ( )
ρ
ρ
/1
0
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫
n
djjxX and its price Xp . Then the profit of the 
final good sector becomes: 
( ) HwXpHXp HXy −−+ εεε /1 . 
This new good X  shows the constant returns to scale with varieties ( )jx , and 
therefore we have the following equality: 
( ) ( )∫=
n
X djjxjpXp
0
. 
Step 1: Xp . 
By solving the following cost minimization problem for the good X , we can find 
that the price of X  is ( ) ( )
( ) ρρ
ρρ
/1
0
1/
−
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛= ∫ djjpp
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ρ
 
Define the Lagrangian L : 
 23
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+= ∫∫ XdjjxdjjxjpL nn
ρ
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/1
00
. 
Then the first order condition w.r.t. ( )jx  gives: 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫ =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ nn
djjxjpdjjx
0
/1
0
 
ρ
ρλ . 
Since ( ) ( )∫= nX djjxjpXp
0
, this implies λ  is equivalent to Xp . By solving for λ , 
we get: 
( ) ( )
( ) ρρ
ρρλ
/1
0
1/
−
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∫nX djjpp . 
By the symmetry ( ) pjp = , Xp  is given by: 
(1)                            ( ) pnpX ρρ /1−= . 
Step 2: X . 
Since the technology of the final good shows the constant returns to scale with X  
and H , we have the following equality: 
y
H
X
p
HwXpy += . 
On the other hand, the demand for the final good is given by: 
y
SSH
p
LHwc += . 
Hence, the final good market clearing cy =  and SHH =  give: 
S
X LXp = . 
Thus X  is given by: 
(2)                             
X
S
p
LX =  
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where ( ) pnpX ρρ /1−= . 
Step 3: 
Hw . 
The first order conditions w.r.t. X  and H  for the final sector are given by: 
( )( ) Xy pXHXp =+ −− 11/11 εεεε εε  
( )( ) Hy wHHXp =+ −− 11/11 εεεε εε . 
These give the following: 
H
X
w
p
H
X =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −1ε . 
By solving for Hw  with (2) and SHH = , Hw  is given by: 
(3)                         
ε
ε
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
S
S
X
H
H
Lpw     
where ( ) pnpX ρρ /1−= . 
C. Ratio of Demand for Each Variety 
The number of varieties used by the final sector increases only from in  to 21 nn +  
in each country 2  and  1=i  after trade. On the other hand, the quantity of each variety 
used by the final sector decreases in each country after trade. We now need a balance of 
trade given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) djjxjpdjjxjp Dnn
n
D
n
*
1
*
2
0
21
1
1 ∫∫
+
=  
where ( ) *Di jx  is the demand for each variety j  by the final sector in country 
2  and  1=i . Let the asterisk * denote the variables after trade, and let the subscript i  
denote the country i . This equality means that the total export value is equal to the total 
 25
import value. By symmetry this becomes: 
*
12
*
21
DD xpnxpn = . 
Thus we get: 
2
1
*
2
*
1
n
n
x
x
D
D
= . 
This means that the ratio of demand for each variety by each country is the ratio of 
number of varieties produced in each country: 21
*
2
*
1 nnxx
DD = . 
D. IIT Index in Our Model 
In our model, there is only one tradable industry: the intermediate goods industry. 
We calculate the IIT index for country 1 as follows. The IIT index for country 1 is given 
by: 
( )11
11
1 1 MX
MX
IIT +
−−=  
where 
*
211
DxnX =  and *121 DxnM = .  
Since ( )[ ] xnnnx D    / 211*1 +=  and ( )[ ] xnnnx D    / 212*2 += , we get: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] 0  /     / 2112212111 =+−+=− xnnnnxnnnnMX . 
Thus the IIT index for country 1 is simply given by 11 =IIT . Similarly, the IIT 
index for country 2 is simply given by 12 =IIT . 
E. The Movement of High-Skilled Labor 
In Section I, we have focused on the interesting case in which the relative wage Hw  
given by (3) is greater than one before trade. Thus the high skill and low skill each do 
their own task, letting HH S =  and LLS = . In this Appendix, we briefly analyze the 
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other case in which the relative wage Hw  given by (3) is one and the high skill is 
doing both high-skill and low-skill tasks before trade. 
In the autarky equilibrium as shown in Figure 3-b, the relative wage Hw  given by 
(3) is one at C, and part of high skill is doing the low-skill task in the intermediate 
goods sector. This movement of high skill from A to C maximizes the output of final 
good, that is, the consumer’s utility. 
As we have seen in I-C, the case as shown in Figure 3-a let us conclude that the skill 
premium rises after trade. On the other hand, if it is one before trade as shown in Figure 
3-b, it can be shown that the relative wage Hw  rises or remains after trade, and in any 
case, the number of varieties used by the final good surely increases. 
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Table 1. U.S. Exports to and Imports from Mexico in 1985 and 1990 
 
1985 
U.S. Exports to Mexico U.S. Imports from Mexico
Rank SITC category Percent SITC category Percent
1 7 - Machinery and Transport Equipment 49 3 - Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials 41
2 5 - Chemicals and Related Products 11 7 - Machinery and Transport Equipment 29
3 6 - Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 10 0 - Food and Live Animals 8
4 2 - Crude Materials, Inedible, except Fuels 9 6 - Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 6
5 8 - Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 7 8 - Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 6
6 0 - Food and Live Animals 7 5 - Chemicals and Related Products 3
7 3 - Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials 4 9 - Commodities & Transact not Class Elsewhere 3
8 9 - Commodities & Transact not Class Elsewhere 3 2 - Crude Materials, Inedible, except Fuels 2
9 4 - Animal and Vegetable Oils, Fats and Waxes 1 1 - Beverages and Tobacco 1
10 1 - Beverages and Tobacco 0 4 - Animal and Vegetable Oils, Fats and Waxes 0
Total 100 Total 100  
 
1990 
U.S. Exports to Mexico U.S. Imports from Mexico
Rank SITC category Percent SITC category Percent
1 7 - Machinery and Transport Equipment 48 7 - Machinery and Transport Equipment 45
2 6 - Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 13 3 - Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials 18
3 8 - Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 11 8 - Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 10
4 5 - Chemicals and Related Products 8 0 - Food and Live Animals 9
5 0 - Food and Live Animals 7 6 - Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 8
6 9 - Commodities & Transact not Class Elsewhere 6 9 - Commodities & Transact not Class Elsewhere 4
7 2 - Crude Materials, Inedible, except Fuels 5 2 - Crude Materials, Inedible, except Fuels 3
8 3 - Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials 3 5 - Chemicals and Related Products 2
9 4 - Animal and Vegetable Oils, Fats and Waxes 0 1 - Beverages and Tobacco 1
10 1 - Beverages and Tobacco 0 4 - Animal and Vegetable Oils, Fats and Waxes 0
Total 100 Total 100  
 
Source: The International Trade Administration. 
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Figure 1. Relative Wage of High-Skilled to Low-Skilled Labor  
in U.S. and Mexico Manufacturing Industries 
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Note: The average annual wage of non-production relative to production 
workers is used as an index of the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled 
labor. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ASM; Hanson and Harrison (1995). 
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Figure 2. Trade between U.S. and Mexico as Percent of U.S. GDP 
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Note: Trade is the sum of U.S. exports to and U.S. imports from Mexico. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the International Trade Administration 
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Figure 3 – a. Autarky Equilibrium with 1>Hw  
 
 
Figure 3 – b. Autarky Equilibrium with 1=Hw  
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Figure 5-a. IIT Index between U.S. and Mexico and Relative Wage of 
High-Skilled Labor in U.S. (Manufacturing Industries) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the OECD ITCS and the ASM. 
 
Figure 5-b. IIT Index between U.S. and Mexico and Relative Wage of 
High-Skilled Labor in Mexico (Manufacturing Industries) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the OECD ITCS; Hanson and Harrison 
(1995). 
